June 20, 2016
Modified how data is collected for each AS to improve accuracy. This is reflected in the sharp decrease at 16062012.
June 16, 2016
Site improvements, updated routeviews-py. Data now available in sqlite format.
January 31st, 2016
@syriabgp is tweeting again.
November 8th, 2015
AS24814 is announcing prefixes again after ~8 months of downtime. Welcome back online!
September 2nd, 2014
July 2014 was an unstable month for the Syrian internet. @syriabgp observed two complete losses of internet connectivity on July 13th and 17th, alongside frequent stability issues throughout the month. Unfortunately, syriabgp.net was offline for several days in early August, so I've decided to reset the graph seen above from when the site came back online, August 20th.
BGP data for the month of July (and a few days before/after) is available below as a CSV file, organized in the format of: [AS#, date, peers, change %]
Syria BGP Data, July 2014 [csv]
Throughout the course of the Syrian civil war, internet stability within Syria has been seriously affected. This is primarily due to governmental actions, with internet access being deliberately cut off to restrict the flow of information.
A primary means of restricting internet access in Syria, as in other places, is to withdraw BGP route advertisements from the country's edge routers. This makes routing data into or out of Syria impossible.
This service monitors the three Autonomous Systems assigned to Syria. Every two hours, the number of prefix advertisements from Syrian Autonomous Systems is totaled, and compared with the previous iteration. Any changes in this number will be reflected as a decimal percentage. A sudden, significant decrease in this number likely indicates that Syrian internet connectivity is disrupted.
Twitter is the preferred method of advertising updates at @syriabgp. Data from routeviews.org.